On June 20, Russian propaganda began distributing photos of Admiral Igor Osipov, commander of the aggressor’s Black Sea Fleet, who “fixed” himself on June 19 in Sevastopol at the “presentation of shoulder straps” to “new officers” of the Russian occupiers’ armed structures.

The question was that the commander of the aggressor’s fleet “disappeared from the radar” after the destruction of the missile cruiser “Moskva”. At the same time, it was reported that he was under house arrest by Russian punitive forces and that the FSB was preparing a corresponding trial against “Sevastopol traitors” who allegedly “failed” the Russian fleet during the aggression.

Russian propaganda explained Osipov’s long absence in the public dimension from alleged “employment in a special operation”; obviously, now such “employment” has suddenly “ended”.
At the same time, on May 26, Russian Rear Admiral Vyacheslav Rodionov was seen in Sevastopol, together with Mikhail Razvozhayev, the city’s pseudo-“governor”, and he was allegedly introduced there as the new commander of the fleet.
On June 1, in Sevastopol, Russian propaganda “promoted” another “leader”, namely the Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Major General Dmitry Pyatunin, who had never been associated with the invaders’ fleet and was a typical “rear guard”.

We pointed out that Rodionov’s and Pyatunin’s candidacies were not “naval” enough to “fully lead” the aggressor’s fleet in Sevastopol, and that their role as interim commanders testified only to the “operational deadlock” of the Russian invaders’ plans, which grew into a “personnel crisis”.

As we wrote on May 15, the occupiers probably have to “somehow solve” the “Osipov problem”. To do this, they can soon declare either the “death of the admiral due to injuries”, or – to demonstrate the “recovered” commander of the fleet.

Our Association said a month ago that both options apparently depended on the Kremlin’s final decision on the admiral, in which something apparently “went wrong”, so the aggressor probably decided “not to take the rubbish out of the house”.

Therefore, Osipov’s release from house arrest was one of the Kremlin’s planned ways out of the stalemate, when the aggressor’s Black Sea Fleet continued to suffer painful losses and remained with the most limited potential even after removing the admiral from command.

Therefore, the Kremlin’s questions about “sabotage” could have arisen regarding the leadership of the Russian military counterintelligence of the FSB, which was probably conducting “admiral work”.

For example, probably after Osipov’s arrest, the Black Sea Fleet was involved in the need to provide a permanent garrison of occupiers on Snake (Zmiiny) Island, “having the potential” for criminal provocations against the Odessa Region and against trade shipping, but whose communications the occupied island itself is clearly vulnerable.

Naturally, the aggressor’s Black Sea Fleet did not come out of the “operational impasse”, sinking deeper into it, and the commander’s personality may to some extent affect his tactics, but not provide any “success”. Therefore, Igor Osipov at this stage was just lucky – the “hostage” of the failures of the Russian fleet was actually saved by its stable crisis.