On May 24, the media spread reports about searches in the house and offices of former Moldovan President Igor Dodon, and it was also announced that this politician had been arrested by Moldovan law enforcement officers, which Russian propagandists later began to actively refute. The criminal proceedings are connected with corruption and the Moldovan oligarch Igor Plahotniuc, who, according to the investigation, transferred money to Dodon.

It should be recalled that Dodon’s pro-Russian views have never been a secret, and in 2016 he illegally stated at a televised debate that allegedly “Crimea belongs to Russia.” Then these statements were disavowed by the Moldovan Foreign Ministry, but in general, the attitude of the Dodon authorities towards Ukraine has always been at least cool, and the Kremlin remained the main partner of his government.

At the same time, Crimean collaborators, the key of which, Volodimir Konstantinov and Sergey Aksenov, are of Moldovan origin and have close commercial contacts with this republic, were actively used by the Kremlin in this direction. During 2020-2021, our Association repeatedly wrote about their close connection with the general criminal and pro-Russian circles of Moldova on both banks of the Dniester.

In particular, there were attempts to use the Danube port of Moldova, Giurgiulesti, to bypass the sanctions to import products of the Crimean chemical industry into the European Union, and some ships flying the Moldovan flag were seen as violating the ban on entering Crimean ports.

In February 2021, we reported that the criminal Valery Gratov “surfaced” in Moldova, who was used by the Russian special services in 2014, when he coordinated and sent pro-Russian “veterans” to Crimea to facilitate the attempted annexation of the peninsula.

Back in 2020, the “Cossacks of Crimea and Sevastopol” controlled by the aggressor’s special services united into a “single Black Sea Cossack army”, as it was reported by the press service of the fake “Head of the Republic of Crimea”. Sergei Aksyonov himself then stated that the “Cossack army” on the peninsula, of course, was created “exclusively thanks to the decision of Vladimir Putin”.

The specificity of the situation was that a similar structure with the same name has been operating in Russian-occupied Tiraspol since 1992, and the obvious intention of the Russian special services was to “unify” the “Crimean and Dniester Cossacks” as controlled paramilitary structures.

In March 2022, statements began to be heard from Crimean collaborators that Crimea would allegedly become a “railway hub” in Russia’s communication with Odessa and Mykolaiv and further with Moldova.

The “Moldovan” vector of Russian aggression intensified after the change by the aggressor in April 2022 of the management vertical of the “special operation” against Ukraine and the appointment of the only commander of the Army General Alexander Dvornikov, whose “work” in Syria was specifically based on paramilitary structures and mercenaries.

After the announcement by Russian generals of criminal plans to “exit to the borders of Moldova” and to fake “protection of the Russian-speaking population of Transnistria”, a series of “terrorist acts” obviously staged by the Kremlin was carried out in the Russian-occupied regions of the republic.

At the same time, as has already been reported, experts are skeptical about the prospects of the special sabotage operation launched by the aggressor in Moldova, in particular its regions occupied by Russia close to the Ukraine’s Odessa Region. At the same time, the Crimean collaborators were given the task of activating as much as possible their own connections in the criminal circles of Moldova in order to facilitate Russian aggression and the hypothetical occupation of Chisinau.

On April 22, representatives of the invaders made several statements regarding the occupied territories of Ukraine and Moldova. In particular, Rustam Minnekaev, acting commander of the Central Military District of Russia, who, according to media reports, is currently may become the commander of this district of the aggressor, declared the criminal goal of “establishing a land corridor” between Crimea and the so-called Transnistria, as allegedly “the task of the second stage of a special military operation against Ukraine”

 In parallel, individual deputies of the Russian State Duma announced the alleged prospects of “recognition” of the so-called “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”. At the same time, in April-May 2022, contacts between the European Union and the United States with the Chisinau authorities intensified, and Moldovan President Maia Sandu recognized Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as aggression.

Now even Russian propaganda admits that in order to “help Tiraspol” Russia needs the criminal capture of Odessa and Mykolaiv, which remains an unattainable prospect for the aggressor. Obviously, it is the situation at the front that determines the “change of vector” in Chisinau and the understanding by the Moldova’s government of the reality of preserving the sovereignty of republic in the context of strengthening its cooperation with NATO and Ukraine.

It is worth predicting that the intensification of the fight against corruption among pro-Russian politicians will also intensify in Bulgaria, the relevant materials regarding the president of which were published by our Association.