There are more than enough mentions in the modern media of the activities and statements of Georgiy Muradov, who became a key executor of Russia’s foreign policy doctrine on “recognition of Russian Crimea” in 2014. Ukrainian journalists have tried several times to cover this issue, but primarily in the context of Muradov’s “office duties” [1; 2] and on his current ties in third countries, in particular in the framework of the “Friends of Crimea” project, which in fact has been put on the “far shelf” by the aggressor State already. “ARC” experts have also repeatedly mentioned Muradov – on his utopian claims of “Crimean trade with Nicaragua” [3], on his current role as head of the “Crimean branch” [4] of the “Eurasian Peoples’ Assembly” [5] and on his “honorary” role of a supernumerary in the “Crimean list of candidates for the State Duma” from “United Russia” [6].

But it would be difficult for a reader, unfamiliar with the details of Georgiy Muradov’s biography, to understand why a man who once held prominent positions in Russia’s top power echelons, is responsible for often caricaturing activities for distributing the deliberately fake concept of “Russian Crimea” through tragicomic “people’s diplomacy”. At the same time, he remains in this place after seven years of obviously zero results of his work and after a number of already “buried” projects.

After all, although the strategic goal of Muradov’s leaders from some “international approval” of Russian aggression is, of course, not feasible in principle, even the tactical steps of its executors to “recognize the annexation of Crimea” did not show signs of systemic nature. Therefore, the real role and real place of Mr. Muradov in the system of modern Kremlin’s “power vertical” and other “verticals” can be understood only in view of the rich past of this character and with the specifics of his “close ties”, which will allow readers to understand – on who and what this person actually works for.

Georgiy Muradov’s story is difficult to understand in isolation from his family, and although the “son is not responsible for the father”, it must be admitted that in this case, the “apple doesn’t fall far from the tree”. “Official” biographies [7] indicate the birth of Mr. Muradov in the village of Kochmes “in a family of doctors who participated in the Great Patriotic War” [8], specifying that the father of the future diplomat, Lev Muradov, was an ethnic Armenian. Mr. Muradov himself does not deny these facts in subsequent interviews, but points out that he is a Russian “from a provincial family”, whose parents were “doctors”. However, in his biography, Mr. George is cunning a bit [9].

His father, born in 1910, is easily found on the Russian portal “Podvig Naroda” (“People’s Feat”) as a participant in World War II, but he is there in the category of “political workers” and he was recorded, as of 1944, as “head of the hospital for the lightly wounded 1993” [10]. Georgiy’s mother is not listed at all on this portal with exactly the data that are in the “official biographies” (where absolutely all the participants of the Second World War were recorded by the USSR authorities). However, there is another nurse who served in the Soviet trophy team, and she has similar to Georgiy’s father’s conscription region and circumstances of service, but – with different middle-name from the “official” one of Mr. Muradov’s mother [11].

So Georgiy’s father was apparently a Soviet political worker assigned to run the hospital, and his mother was either not really a participant in the war at all, or for some reason was forced to change her middle name after working with German trophies. It must be recalled that there was a corresponding campaign in the USSR for the “squatting of magpies” related to the theft of German trophies after the Second World War. These hypotheses are confirmed by the birthplace of Georgiy Muradov. As Kochmes, located in Komi Republic, was not just a village, but a settlement of Soviet concentration camps with a continuous history of extermination of prisoners from 1932 to 1954. Kochmes played the role of a “rear” concentration camp, where prisoners were actually taken to die, for which there was a “hospital” and a “baby house”, as even prisoners’ children, born in captivity, were not released from the Gulag’s camps [12].

Mortality of those born in such “baby houses”, even according to modern official Russian data, reached 80%, i.e. – it was not inferior to Auschwitz and Treblinka ones. Of course, there were never any “civilian hospitals” in Kochmes, so it is obvious that Georgiy Muradov was born in a family of “responsible workers” of the relevant Gulag’s “medical institutions”, who purposefully exterminated prisoners of various enslaved peoples of the USSR, including peoples of Ukraine and the Baltic states. So Mr. Muradov literally “absorbed in his mother’s milk” the “love for everything Ukrainian”

We would not focus in detail on this “family” issue as, first, Mr. Muradov himself emphasized repeatedly the importance of parental advice in choosing his life path (in his words, “my father instilled in me a love of politics and geography” [13]) and secondly, if Georgiy Muradov had not tried in his own interviews to justify the crimes of the Stalinist regime. Therefore, for example, the life of the Mr. Muradov’s own sons, namely a former official of the Putin’s administration and a deputy governor in Naryan-Mar on procurement and on other very interesting criminal issues Yuri Muradov [14] and the head of the concert agency “Eventation”, that carries out, under the roof of the relevant Russian state services,  “recruitment” of third countries’ singers and groups, Sergei Muradov, as “successors of the KGB-diplomatic dynasty” [15] is of little interest to us. After all, their father prudently does not interfere with Yuri and Sergei in his “Crimean affairs”.

And the life path for Mr. Georgiy’s alleged “originating from a simple family of doctors” turned out to be remarkable, because he studied at the Moscow Institute of International Relations and then in 1979 immediately entered the foreign service of Soviet diplomacy, and – in Greece, a capitalist country, a NATO member. Anyone who understands Soviet realities will agree that no “Leninist scholarship” would be enough for such graduate’s somersault. But if you model the beginning of the career of the “KGB dynasty” successor, then everything becomes clear.

But later the most interesting episode begins in Mr. Muradov’s biography. The “official version” says that he allegedly worked “in various positions in the central office and foreign institutions of the USSR Foreign Ministry” until 1992, and that he allegedly “grew up” to the first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Greece. But we were able to find a 1991 publication listing Mr. Muradov as “press attaché of the Soviet embassy in Greece” and forcing him to explain the reasons for the “financial difficulties” that arose with the “Moscow News” newspaper’s publication in Greece [16].

It is worth reminding the reader that until 1990 this newspaper was a format of Soviet News Agency’s foreign propaganda, as the successor to the Soviet Information Bureau and it was an almost undisguised component of Soviet intelligence, primarily military one. “Successful usage” of these funds in Greece by Mr. Muradov may have gone unnoticed in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, but in subsequent interviews Georgiy repeatedly complained about “excessive bureaucratization and control” in the field of spending by Soviet and, accordingly, Russian embassies the funds for “support of compatriots” [17]. It is obvious that this issue has remained for Mr. Muradov as a very painful memory of “fighting youth”, since the time of the deals with the “Moscow News”.

Later, an even more interesting page begins in Mr. Muradov’s biography, as he was promoted in already independent Russia to adviser-envoy to Bulgaria and later to Russia’s ambassador to Cyprus until 1999. The appointment of a Russian spy to Sofia and Nicosia, closer to his elaborated Greek ties, was quite logical, not to mention the “pure” diplomat, who is usually appointed to a new position in another country with significant geographical “castlings”.

But it is in Cyprus that Mr. Muradov’s activities seem to have gone far beyond both the ambassador’s and the Russian spy’s ones. It will be recalled that in the 1990s, Russian capital was withdrawn to third countries, safe for the jurisdiction, and then it was returned to Russia through legal entities and financial institutions in Cyprus. At the same time, this process was mutually beneficial, first of all, to Russia’s powerful business and to the Cypriot and Greek authorities and financial elite, to the relevant secret services and organized crime in Greece, but not to Russia itself as a state.

Here is one example, with the “Bank of Moscow”, founded by Yury Luzhkov in 1995. In 2011, the new Moscow authorities found a shortage of “only-for-only” 250 billion rubles, ie – more than 8 billion dollars. Luzhkov’s protégé Andriy Borodin, who was a co-owner of the institution through the Cypriot offshore “Plenium Invest”, In this case, the banking institution issued billion-dollar loans to the structure of “Inteko” belonged to Luzhkov’s wife, Yelena Baturina [18]. Although Mrs. Baturina later became involved in a number of scandals [19], “arrests”, investigations [20] and criminal cases [21], she still remains the richest woman businessman in Russia and certainly she has a steady “investment interest” in Cyprus. Her and former Moscow mayor’s common daughter, Yelena Luzhkova, now has Cypriot citizenship [22].

It was impossible for Ambassador Muradov not to have a direct relation to these deals, because in his memoirs of those times he acknowledged his more than friendly relations with Yury Luzhkov, who constantly came to Cyprus. However, Muradov apparently provided “friendly services” in Cyprus to other then-bosses and oligarchs of Russia, because Russia sold at that time its government credit obligations (treasury bills) to the world markets just through the banks of the island. Let us remind readers that it was the multibillion-dollar scam with these Russian treasury bills in August 1998 that led to the default of Russia, to the devaluation of the Russian ruble, to the social crisis and to the coming to Russia’s power Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, former Soviet professional spy and Director of the Russian Intelligence Service.

Interestingly, such Russians’ activity, in contrast to “mutually beneficial” scams such as the “Bank of Moscow” one, was not very well received by Cypriots. After all, then Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides, who died mysteriously in 2013, and Finance Minister Christodoulos Christodoulou, who is currently in prison for fraud, [23] have been eager to meet with Boris Yeltsin since August 1998 to “find out” the situation, but Russian supreme powers shyly avoided such meeting.

Georgiy Muradov naively admits in his memoirs that Yury Luzhkov helped him to organize the “meeting point” of those Cyprus leaders with Yeltsin, and “the issue was completely resolved” during Yevgeny Primakov’s short period of Russian Prime-Minister statute [24]. We can find out from the press at the time, how exactly it was “solved”, because in February 1999, with Ambassador Muradov’s direct and active assistance, an agreement was reached on the supply of Russian anti-aircraft systems “S-300” to Cyprus. It is noteworthy that at that time the Russian press questioned what caused such an obvious heating up of Greece’s interests in the region and “Russia’s game against Turkey”, in which Muradov became actively involved [25]. Apparently, at that time it was not yet known about the meeting talks of the Cypriot leadership on the “default” consequences with Luzhkov and Primakov in Moscow, which Muradov recklessly spoke about fifteen years later.

It is noteworthy that by “betting” on Luzhkov’s money and on Primakov’s Soviet-grounded ties, diplomat Muradov lost his career at the Russian Foreign Ministry forever, as Luzhkov’s clan was pushed back in 1999 from certain Kremlin levers by other groups. Mr. Muradov not only “knew too much” and not only acted objectively for the benefit of the financial leadership, intelligence services and criminals of Greece and some Russian businessmen, but he also “sought much more” by relying on his patrons. Therefore, the newly appointed Russian Fireign Minister Igor Ivanov decided to get rid of such a “toxic competitor” in the department in the fall of 1999 [26]. However, Mr. Muradov’s “friendly services” were not forgotten by Luzhkov, and he took Georgiy to the Moscow City Government, having previously cynically used the former ambassador as a technical candidate to “organize the desired result” for next deputee Igor Khankoev in the State Duma elections at the Krasnodar Territory [27]. Thus, the fake “Crimean elections to the State Duma” in 2021 were not the first clowning with “ballots” in Mr. Muradov’s career.

In Moscow, Mr. Muradov, well acquainted with the Greek financial oligarchy and with the system of money laundering through the Cypriot offshore, spent ten years as head of the City Department of Foreign Economic Relations. He took care of “investments” from Cyprus in the tens of billions of dollars [28] and he actually introduced an interesting scheme of spending money to help “Russian compatriots”, for which the Moscow City Government annually allocated up to 350 million rubles (up to 12 million dollars). Of course, the Russian federal budget then also spent money for these needs, but, as Mr. Muradov admitted in 2008, “there is a specificity” [29], in fact very simple one – there was at least some control to spend “federal” and not “Moscow” funds. At that time, Mr. Muradov “generously” created in Moscow, as one of the “washing machines” for such “aid for compatriots”, a “Moscow House of Compatriots”, the first director of which was the infamous Konstantin Zatulin, and the next one – Yuri Kaplun [30].

During this period Mr. Muradov became very familiar with Crimean issues, as we may say, “with a calculator”, because all the “Moscow municipal” funds to support “Crimean compatriots”, on which Luzhkov built the political capital as the “fighter for Sevastopol” in Moscow, went through the former ambassador and it was he who mastered the appropriate “kickbacks”. However, Mr. Muradov’s Crimean plans to “disburse funds” then went far beyond the “assistance to compatriots”, because, for example, in 2007 the Moscow City Government not only signed declarations of “investment” hundreds of millions of dollars in Yalta, but it also claimed several billions to be mastered through “the construction of hotel complexes on the Kerch Peninsula” [31].

It is noteworthy that Mr. Muradov did not forget about Cyprus, periodically visiting the island on behalf of the Moscow city government. However, this “festival of spending Moscow money in the Crimea” ended for Mr. Muradov in 2010 after the change of powers in Moscow, because Georgiy was removed immediately from his Moscow City office along with Luzhkov and financier of Moscow Mayor Yuri Korostelev [32]. Prior the Russian occupation of Crimea begun, Muradov was appointed as deputy head of “Rossotrudnichestvo” as a federal structure formed in 2008 to “protect the rights of compatriots”, with full name “Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation”. This happened with the help of Yevgeny Primakov, the old Muradov’s patron, whose grandson, also Yevgeny, is currently the head of “Rossoprudnichestvo”. At that time, Mr. Muradov, not surprisingly, returned to the “Greek direction”, for example, “noting” in 2013 in the organizers of the Russian-Greek business forum [33] and in a number of other similar events in 2011 [34], including joint with such a tendentious structure of Russian and probably Greek special services as the “Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society” [35].

Also during this period, Mr. Muradov actively calls himself the head of the Society “Cultural and Business Cooperation and Friendship with the Peoples of Greece and Cyprus” “Filia”. Let’s make a modest hypothesis that a person, who suits not only the Russian but also the Greek “side of the dialogue”, could be appointed to this position, especially considering that Mr. Muradov did not have anything formally in common with Greece, except for diplomatic service there. The study of the status of the “Filia” as an “interregional public organization” allows us to come to interesting conclusions.

After all, this “Filia”, together with Igor Vaginakovich Sarkisov and with the “Moscow Union of Public Associations – Societies of Friendship with Peoples of Foreign Countries” acted as the founder of the “Club of Friends of Moscow”, which in its turn founded the “World Humanitarian Union” [36], or “World Union of Humanitarian, Charitable, Peacekeeping and Environmental Organizations”, liquidated in 2020. In its turn, the “Moscow Union of Public Associations”, then transformed into an organization for the development of tourist relations “Vokrug Sveta” (“Around the World”), led by Marina Kuznetsova, and registered in Moscow in Yauzovsky Lane, in the house 11 [37], which is an abandoned municipal building, and was previously used as an illegal brothel [38].

In addition, Kuznetsova herself, together with another co-founder of the Muradov’s “Filia”, Aleksandr Petrychko, are the founders of another legal entity with the same name, “Filia”, but registered in an apartment in a new Moscow building [39]. At the same time, Igor Sarkisov, together with Karen Mirzoyan, are the “founders” of more than ten “civil structures” including the “National Emergency Protection Service” and the “International Center for Social, Legal and Intellectual Programs”, which researchers of Russian organized criminality link to probable service of the interests of the respective ethnic criminal groups.

These organizations, which were permanently formed and liquidated with all sorts of formal “founders”, were united, in addition to high-profile names and connections with Mr. Muradov, who still personally heads more than ten similar structures, as well as with the Armenian diaspora in Moscow so with possibility to spend significant funds “nowhere”. It should also be added that the first, Muradov’s “Filia” is registered in Moscow in the former Varvara Morozova’s mansion on Vozdvizhenka, 14 [40] which officially belongs to the Administration of the Russian President [41]. It is noteworthy that more than thirty “non-governmental organizations” created for cooperation with foreign countries, including the “Byzantine Club” and the “Society of Friendship and Cooperation with Armenia”, are registered in the same Moscow address.

We will add that the “Byzantium” theme was constantly reflected in Mr. Muradov’s speeches and statements, both before and later 2014 [42; 43]. Modern researchers of Russian aggression against Ukraine are lost in speculations – why it was worth for Mr. Muradov to galvanize such a specific issue, which objectively does not add any bonuses to the Russian ideology and interests [44]. But if we assume that someone is acting not in the Russian authorities’ interests only, but also for certain persons from a skyscraper on Kanellopoulou Avenue, such Mr. Muradov’s modus vivendi becomes clear.

The appointment of Georgiy Muradov as a “Vice Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea” and at the same time as the “Representative of the Republic of Crimea to the President of the Russian Federation” since 2014 has made him one of the main “speakers of Russian world” in the occupied Crimea, his acts and speeches are reflected en masse by Russian propaganda and by Ukrainian press also. But objectively, even regarding the “organizational and managerial achievements”, Mr. Muradov’s “work results” are quite modest, which of course is a good news, because a person, less focused on his own enrichment and of his cooperation with Greek partners, could serve the aggressor’s criminals intentions more effectively.

For example, the “Mission of the Republic of Crimea under the President of the Russian Federation” headed by Georgiy in Moscow, gave birth to about ninety similar statements and appeals, primarily on behalf of Mr. Muradov himself, during the seven years of occupation of the Crimea [45]. Also the former diplomat recruited the “friendly staff” of this “state body” from the former employees of the Moscow city government, such as Vladimir Grafkov [46] or Nikolai Zyryanov [47] or Sergei Kudrin, whom Mr. Muradov took with him to “Rossotrudnichestvo” earlier [48]. Whether it is not even debatable, may this cozy gathering place of Moscow middle-class robbers offer “something conceptual” for the Crimean dimension.

The rest of Muradov’s projects are successful only in the format of “domesticating the federal funds”, and at the same time in the favorite style of Mr. Georgiy, “without excessive and burdensome control”. Moreover, the “Business and Cultural Center of the Republic of Crimea”, that was formed during the “representation” [49] was not distinguished by any “achievement” but by the successful “mastering the funds” during the years of occupation only. The transfer of its “director” Yaroslav Ivanchenko, who also headed the ‘Foreign Investment Agency’, to the “management of the Institute” of the Yalta “Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy” being under the aggressor’s control [50] did not significantly change the situation. By the way, it is noteworthy that Mr. Ivanchenko, who was in fact the only person somehow connected with the Crimea in Muradov’s “Moscow office”, headed this Moscow-located “Agency” since 2011 [51], and “after returning” to the Crimea he “founded in Evpatoria LLC” “Prybrezhnoye”, with the interesting deals to be highlighted in the separate article.

We should also not forget about the “attenuation” of the “Friends of Crimea” project actively lobbied by Mr. Muradov, by the termination from 2019 of his other creation, the “annual conference” “Crimea in the modern international context” and the cancellation for last two years, allegedly due to quarantine restrictions, a so-called “Yalta Economic Forum”, previously loudly advertised by the Russian invaders.

Another “beloved child” of Mr. Muradov, a so-called “Black Sea Association of International Cooperation”, also holds only a few essentially “intra-Crimean” “events” per year. The previously “high level of representative assets” among the “association’s” own “speakers” can be boasted only by Ms. Anastasia Gridchina, who quite clumsily portrays the “Ukrainian community” of the peninsula. In 2021, after the death of the formal head of the “Black Sea Association”, Mr. Jan Epstein, the main “media event” of this structure, in addition to the “solemn celebration” of the “200th anniversary of Nicaragua’s independence”, was the “election of Georgiy Muradov as president of the association” [52].

Mr. Muradov himself has repeatedly tried to promote his “Greek party” in the Crimea since 2014, in particular by taking part in some formal Cypriot-Russian [53] or Greek-Russian [54] “active relations” on behalf of the “Filia” [55]. But these formal or even fake measures did not affect the position of relevant EU state members on the Crimea and, moreover, such measures did not protect Mr. Muradov from personal sanctions imposed by the European Union, that were imposed precisely for his “Crimean activities”. It is noteworthy that apart from expressions of concern from some minor Greek clerks [56] and except from letters from certain commercial Greek structures [57], this did not lead to any consequences, and neither Greece nor Cyprus did anything to relieve Mr. Muradov of sanctions.

This is understandable, because such a useful person is needed by the relevant Greek institutions not in Athens or Limassol, but in Moscow, and not for the “Crimean agenda” promotion, but on other issues. And Muradov’s sub-sanction is a very useful thing for them, because due to his possible disobedience it will be possible to “suddenly discover the account” and to block it. Formally, Greece’s participation in Muradov’s “Crimean adventures” boils down to tolerating the propaganda activities of certain members of the Greece-Russia society, [58] such as Pavlos Hristu, a “retired lieutenant general” [59]. It is noteworthy that on Russian-language sites you can find another advertisement for Mr. Hristu, namely – about his massage parlor in Athens [60]. That is why it remains for Mr. Muradov, in the face of a “public figure”, to constantly watch online on various international platforms about the alleged oppression of so-called “Russian Crimea”, about which there are at least some documentary mentions, first of all, in Russian propaganda [61].

Under these conditions Armenia became Muradov’s main practical “vector of work”, where he can demonstrate “at least some indicators”. Our Association has already written about the ties of the Crimean Armenian diasporas with Yerevan, and about the support of the “Friends of Crimea” by the relevant ethnic criminal groups from Yalta. Although Mr. Muradov’s goal of “direct air service” [62] “Simferopol-Yerevan” [63] was not achieved, the situation of Armenia as a Russia’s satellite allows the “representative of the Republic of Crimea” to develop “rapid activities” there or at least to make their active imitation.

These are primarily the functioning of the “Club of Friends of Crimea” in Armenia [64] and the “Days of Crimea” in Armenia [65], whose main partners in Yerevan are the leader of the Constitutional Party Hayk Babukhanyan and the leader of the Alliance Party Tigran Urikhanyan [66]. Both of them are currently “active politicians” and members of the Armenian National Assembly. It is noteworthy that during a trip to Yerevan in 2021, Mr. Muradov, despite his absence from meetings with Armenian leaders, stated that he “managed to see his own friends from Karabakh” [67] and made a number of other provocative theses, which outraged the Azerbaijan’s media [68].

Muradov’s “local partners” in Yerevan are also notable, and while Mr. Urikhanyan is an ordinary pro-Russian politician with sincere support from ‘Gazprom’, Mr. Babukhanyan is one of the Armenian conservatives who see Russia as a “lesser evil” in the fight against the “Turkic world”. Politician and parliamentarian Babukhanyan [69], in particular, pointed out that “it is time for Armenia to think about creating its own nuclear weapons” [70] and that “the desire for genocide is inherent in Turkish minds and it does not depend on education or on other circumstances” [71].

It is clear that Muradov’s support for such not just pro-Russian, but anti-Turkish Armenian politicians, as well as for Armenia’s activities in Karabakh, is in the interests of the relevant Greek structures, according to the standard principle of “my enemy’s enemy”. But, “strangely enough”, Mr. Muradov, at the same time as he is visiting Yerevan, is persistently trying to “build bridges of friendship between the Crimea and Turkey”. It would be really strange and even a little pointless, except for Mr. Muradov’s “Greek traces” and the corresponding wishes of his “financial partners from Cyprus”, according to which “something interesting should be organized in Ankara”, which Georgiy is forced to implement.

Otherwise, something very bad could “suddenly” happen to the relevant Cypriot accounts. Because if the “prominent Russian diplomat” should be guided purely by the interests of the aggressor State, then of course the “Turkish direction”, for basic logical reasons, would be given by Mr. Muradov in “other hands”, on the principle of “souvlaki with hash separately, and kebabs – separately”. But this did not happen, and the same person “works fruitfully” not only in the Armenian and Greek “directions”, but also “in the Turkish dimension”.

For the “Turkish gambit”, Muradov used a tool that was “worked out” by the Russians for a long time, namely Mr. Ünver Sel and the so-called “Crimean Tatar Deinek Federation”, headed by “DikGAZETE” journalist İlber Vasfi Sel [72]. The activities of these individuals in favor of the “Russian world” since 2005, as well as the fake, non-representative nature of their “Federation”, which actually consists of the two above-mentioned individuals and a handful of their business partners, have already been reported by Ukrainian media [73]. It is worth noting that Ünver Sel and İlber Vasfi Sel periodically visit the occupied Crimea, contrary to Ukrainian law, imitating “active cooperation” [74] with the local “administration” [75], which is periodically “highlighted” by Muradov’s “Black Sea Association”.

Moreover, exactly the İlber Vasfi Sel was the owner of the company “Sel” with the “Russian code” 1159102122893, “registered” and later “closed” by the Russian invaders in 2015 in Simferopol [76]. And the real purpose of this “company” is a separate and very interesting history.

At the same time, it is no secret that the Russian invaders mostly use Ünver Sel in tandem with Crimean Tatar collaborators of the “public movement” “Qirim Birligi”, led by the odious Seitumer Nimetullayev, former head of the Henichesk district administration, Ukraine’s Kherson Region, who was selected for this role by the Russian special services. In particular, the joint statements of Nimetullayev and Sel about the “new elections of the kurultai” were broadcasted by Russian TASS in 2015 [77], in Simferopol Sel sat in the presidium of the fake “Council of the Crimean Tatar People” held by “Qirim Birligi” [78], and “Regions of Russia” published in 2018 a propagandistic article on how “together with the head of “Qirim Birligi” Seitumer Nimetullayev Ünver Sel implements the strategy of uniting the peoples of Crimea under the peaceful sky of Russia” [79].

In addition, only “Qirim Birligi” is listed on Muradov’s “Black Sea Association’s” web resources as an alleged “partner organization” among several currently existing so called “Crimean Tatar structures” controlled by the Kremlin. It will be recalled that Ukrainian law enforcement officers currently have systematic claims against Mr. Nimetullayev not only over his love for Mr. Putin, but also over his, to put it mildly, criminal talents, in the area of public property theft, fraud with lands of the Kherson Region, etc.

That is why the so-called “Days of Crimean Tatar Culture in Ankara” currently distributed by Georgiy Muradov, will obviously be organized in tandem by Nimetullayev and Sel. It is obvious that holding such events is in the common interest of both Muradov’s direct Moscow bosses and of his “business partners” and “close friends” from Athens and Yerevan. And as long as former ambassador Muradov plays his Nibelung role over the billions, withdrawn from Russia to Cyprus and Greece, his activity in this direction will remain unchanged.